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t This Article was originally presented as a paper entitled, "The Common Law
Rules of Statutory and Contract Construction: When Does the Deployment of Their
Conflicting Canons Become Simply a War of Words and How Can the Danger Be
Avoided?" The paper was presented at the Hadley v. Baxendale Conference, "The
Common Law of Contracts as a World Force in Two Ages of Revolution," held at the
University of Gloucestershire, Gloucester, England, June 7-8, 2004. Thanks to
Marsha Huie and Marty Belsky for their comments on earlier versions of this Article.
The inspiration for my thesis is Frank Michelman's recent scholarship calling into
question our notions of legitimacy. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Modus Viventi
Postmoderus? On Just Interpretations and the Thinning of Justice, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1945 (2000); Frank I. Michelman, Relative Constraint and Public Reason: What
Is "The Work We Expect of Law"? 67 BROOK. L. REV. 963 (2002); Frank I.
Michelman, Postmodernism, Proceduralism, and Constitutional Justice: A Comment
on van der Walt and Botha, 9 CONSTELLATIONS 246 (2002); Frank I. Michelman, The
Problem of ConstitutionalInterpretive Disagreement: Can "Discoursesof Application"
Help?, in HABERMAS AND PRAGMATISM 113 (Mitchell Aboulafia et al. eds., 2002);
Frank I. Michelman, ConstitutionalLegitimation for PoliticalActs, 66 MOD. L. REV. 1
(2003). Michelman's concern is with constitutional law but his inquiries apply with
equal force to the common law and its rules of interpretation.
4 Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Nonprofit Law Center, University of Tulsa College of Law.
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INTRODUCTION

It is remarkable that the common law remains as vibrant and as
vulnerable today as it was in the nineteenth century. Its vibrancy continues to be illuminated by its responsiveness to societal changes; its
vulnerability continues to reflect the flip-side of that responsiveness:
an inherent indeterminacy. The analysis that follows investigates the
feasibility of maintaining the former characteristic while curtailing the
latter, and it is limited to the common law in its interpretive capacity.
The principal focus of the analysis is, in keeping with the theme of the
conference, the common law of contracts. From that perspective, the
Article articulates the problem of indeterminacy in contract cases and
proposes a resolution. The crux of my argument is that indeterminacy
undermines the legitimacy of the common law to the extent that interpretation in a particular case seems arbitrary or worse-biased and
partisan. The antidote might be an interpretive rule regime that compels transparency in judicial decisionmaking. The obvious venue for
the project is the Restatement. Because, contract law is primarily interpretive, a re-articulation of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
which captures and makes explicit the predominance of interpretation
in contract law and the availability of alternative interpretive rules at
each step of judicial decisionmaking in contracts cases, would encourage judges to make their interpretive choices explicit and their
reasoning more apparent. This, in turn, would constrain indeterminacy by holding judges responsible for persuading us that their choice
of interpretive rules in a particular context was neither arbitrary, nor
biased, nor partisan, but a legitimate choice among competing
alternatives.
Some forty years before Hadley v. Baxendale1 was decided, an influential German jurist, Frederich Karl von Savigny, published his authoritative commentary on the law. It was entitled Of the Vocation of
2 In that text, he derided
Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence.
1. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
2. THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 290-300 (Clarence Morris ed., 1991) (reFREDERICK CHARLES VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCA-

printing selected excerpts from

(Abram Hayward trans.,
1831)). Savigny wrote extensively about law. His treatise on the law of possession
was considered a landmark, but he is best known as a scholar of the common law.
Savigny argued that the law of a nation, like its language must have an organic connection with the people which allows it to develop as the nation, itself, develops. Savigny believed that a nation thrives under a legal system which incorporates
customary principles, "the aggregate existence of the community, which it does not
cease to be" which are continuously reinterpreted by the courts to keep pace with
evolution of the nation. Id. at 291. Codification, he argued, severs the law's organic
connection with a nation's past and imposes an artificial rigidity upon the law so that
it could not accommodate the future. Thus, he found Third Century (C.E.) Roman
law a useful paradigm because it "[held] fast by the long-established, without allowing
[itself] to be fettered by it . . . [and it] exhibit[ed] everywhere a gradual, wholly-organic development." Id. at 294. Only in the Sixth Century when Rome was in deTION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE
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legal systems dominated by a system of codified law, and he extolled

the virtues of legal systems rooted in historical, customary principles
and reinvigorated through judicial interpretation.' Savigny's treatise
was intended as a response in opposition to attempts to draft a comprehensive code for the German states,4 but his arguments continue to
resonate as the fundamental tenets of historical jurisprudence and to
explain the enduring strength of those customary legal systems for
which the common law is the most notable exemplar. 5
Indisputably, the common law owes its redoubtable success to its
singular ability to facilitate evolutionary change in a society by addressing new conditions with the cultural authority of historicallyrooted principles. 6 Famously, the common law views law not as a
static body of rules but as an ongoing process of synthesizing the old
with the new.7 And it is that perspective that makes the common law,

cline, did Rome codify its law. "If, in the first place, we consider the juridical works of
Justinian, consequently, that form in which the Roman law has come down to modem
Europe, we cannot but remark a season of decline in them." Id. at 293. For Savigny
codification was a symptom of a nation in decline.
3. See id. 290-300.
4. Id. at 289.
5. Savigny was one of the leading lights of the nineteenth century school of historical jurisprudence. Late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars recognized the important insights of the historical school: that legal precepts are rooted in
the history of a society and that all law, whether codified or customary requires interpretation or elaboration in particular court cases. See, e.g., Jean Dabin, General Theory of Law, in THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN (Kurt
Wilk trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1950). Nevertheless, they have also pointed out that
there is nothing sacrosanct about the evolutionary development of law through judicial interpretation. To varying degrees, judicial interpretation is always subjective.
See, e.g., EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
(Walter L. Moll trans., Transaction Publishers 2002) (1936). Ehrlich states, "The Historical School of jurisprudence has taken infinite pains to show how "customary law"
or, to put it more accurately, legal propositions of "customary law," arise immediately
in the popular consciousness. It is a vain endeavor .... " "The judge is never delivered up to the legal proposition, bound hand and foot, without any will of his own,
and the more general the legal proposition, the greater the freedom of the judge .... "
Finally, "In the case of a judge ... the value Qf the performance is decisive of the
success of his intellectual labor. If the legal proposition is good and practical, its
chances of gaining recognition are as fair as the chances of a good and practical idea
in any other sphere .... " Id.
6. Discussion of the common law are, of course, legion. But see, BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9 (Yale Univ. Press 1921).
7. See id. "The common law does not work from pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them deductively. Its
method is inductive, and it draws its generalization from particulars." Id. at 22-23.
"The rules and principles of case law have never been treated as final truths,
but as working hypotheses, continually retested in those great laboratories of
the law, the courts of justice. Every new case is an experiment; and if the
accepted rule which seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered. It may not be modified at once, for the attempt to do absolute justice in every single case would make the
development and maintenance of general rules impossible; but if a rule continues to work injustice, it will eventually be reformulated."
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in both its law-making and its law-interpreting functions, so uniquely
suited to act as a model for accommodating the radical technological,
social, and economic changes that roil the world, threatening to
destabilize developing nations and emerging transnational
organizations.
Nevertheless, it is also apparent that this very strength of the common law-its mediating capacity which is attributable to its inherent
flexibility-is also its inherent weakness. I will explicate that problem
by focusing on one aspect of the common law: its interpretive capacity. That is, the interpretive rules it applies to private contracts and to
public statutes.8 For purposes of my argument, I will treat the two
rule regimes together.9 These interpretive rules, like the common law
of which they are a part, share a remarkable capacity to endure, to
remain relevant, and to accommodate change. Their enduring relevance, of course, is made possible because they operate by applying
broad-based principles to specific situations-an operation that perId. at 23 (quoting Munroe Smith).
8. The interpretive function is not entirely a species of common law rules. Both
federal statutes and state statutes occasionally establish rules for construing particular
statutes and types of contracts. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of
Statutory Interpretation,115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2089 n.10 (2002) (listing state interpretive codes).
9. It is readily apparent that while statutory construction and interpretation of
contracts are not identical enterprises, they are sufficiently similar to be treated for
purposes of this discussion, as synonymous. For purposes of this discussion, they
share a dominant characteristic: flexibility, which is both their strength and their
Achilles' heel. And they each fit within the rubric of "interpretive regime" defined by
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey as follows:
An interpretive regime is a system of background norms and conventions
against which the Court will read statutes [or contracts]. An interpretive
regime tells lower court judges, agencies, and citizens how strings of words in
statutes [or contracts] will be read, what presumptions will be entertained as
to statutes' [or a contract's] scope and meaning, and what auxiliary materials
might be consulted to resolve ambiguities.
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term-Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66 (1993). At the same time it must
be said that differences between the two regimes abound. An exhaustive list of differences would be unwarranted here but, as a striking example, legislative history as an
interpretive tool in statutory construction opens a Pandora's Box that has no discernible counterpart in contract interpretation. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The CentralRole of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation,
93 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2005); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in
a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457 (2000); John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1529 (2000); Jonathan R. Siegel, Timing and Delegation:A Reply, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1543 (2000); Stephen F. Williams, Restoring Context, Distorting Text: Legislative History and the Problem of Age, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1366 (1998); John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997); Stephen
Breyer, The 1991 Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture on the Uses of Legislative History in
InterpretingStatutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role
of OriginalIntent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988);
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
17 (1977).
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mits a certain flexibility. But flexibility can lead to indeterminacy,
which threatens to undermine credibility and, with it, the perceived
legitimacy of the common law process itself. Put cryptically, we may
ask: if contractual or statutory words can reasonably be interpreted to
mean a variety of things, then what legitimacy does a court decision
that chooses a particular meaning have?
I will explore the problem as follows. Part I lays out the underlying
premise of the article: that a relative indeterminacy is endemic to the
interpretive project. Part II develops the premise by showing how indeterminacy has become a critical problem in today's legal climate.
Part III identifies several proposals for addressing the indeterminacy
problem in statutory interpretation. Notably, recent scholarship
about the indeterminacy problems of interpretation deals almost exclusively with the issue in the statutory context. The magnitude of
that scholarship is, arguably, some evidence that Part II's analysis of
the effects of result-oriented judicial activism accurately describes an
incipient crisis in legitimacy.
Part IV addresses the indeterminacy problem in the context of contract law. Using the Hadley case as a venerable model, I argue that
interpretation is endemic to contracts law issues; however, courts
often fail to articulate their ubiquitous selection and application of
interpretive rules. Moreover, the Restatement itself fails to reflect
and to make manifest the ubiquity of interpretive rule selection in
contract law. A re-articulation of the Restatement, I conclude, could
ameliorate the indeterminacy problem (without sacrificing the flexibility the common law permits) if it revealed the overarching presence of
interpretive rule selection in contract law decisions. A simple paradigm shift of the rules is all that is required.
11.

COMMON LAW RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND THE
INDETERMINACY PROBLEM

A logical starting point for explicating the indeterminacy problem is
Karl Llewellyn's famous Vanderbilt Law Review article, where he argued persuasively that the canons of interpretation form a point/counterpoint system for legal argument and not a formula for pinpointing a
pre-ordained legal result.1 0 As Llewellyn explained decades ago in
the Vanderbilt piece, for every rule there is its mirror opposite." With

10. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
11. Llewellyn invites the reader to view the interpretive enterprise as a dueling
match, wherein opposing arguments are characterized as fencing maneuvers. So, for
example, "Thrust": "It is a general rule of construction that where general words follow an enumeration they are to be held as applying only to persons and things of the
same general kind or class specifically mentioned (ejusdem generis)" is followed by
"Parry": "General words must operate on something. Further, ejusdern generis is only
an aid in getting the meaning and does not warrant confining the operations of a
statute within narrower limits than were intended." Id. at 405 (citations omitted).
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regard to statutory interpretation, for example, he pointed out that
the interpretive canon that declares, "A statute cannot go beyond its
text"12 can be blocked or confronted by the opposing canon that "[t]o13
effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text.'
Similarly, in contract law the "Four Corners Rule" of contract interpretation1 4 can be contradicted by the rule that the court may interpret the words of the contract in light of the context and
circumstances in which it was drafted. 5 In other words, the point (interpretation is textbound) is contradicted by the counterpoint (interpretation may go beyond the text). As we know, this list of conflicting
pairs of canons is extensive. Moreover, across this interpretive divide,
judges can also launch entirely different principles at a statute or a

contract. For example, in the context of statutory construction, the
canon that the plain meaning is paramount might be trumped by an
appeal to legislative history whereby congressional committee reports
might be said to reveal more about the legislative intent of the statute
than its explicit words do or socio/economic change might be relevant
to enlighten us as to what the legislature would have intended the

words to mean in a new and different situation. This surfeit of interpretive tools raises the obvious question: how are we to rank the relative importance or authority of conflicting rules so as to preserve the
legitimacy of the interpretive enterprise?
Some jurists and scholars have attempted to clarify the problem and
diminish the cacophony of competing rules by pointing out that each
of them is an iteration of a particular theory about interpretation.
Theories like textualism

6

or intentionalism"7 have been developed

12. Id. at 401.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., E. Crossroads Ctr., Inc. v. Mellon-Stuart Co., 205 A.2d 865, 866 (Pa.
1965) ("When a written contract is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone."); Best v. Realty Mgmt. Corp., 101 A.2d 438, 440 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1953) ("A court is not authorized to construe a written contract in such a
way as to modify the plain meaning of its words, under the guise of interpretation.").
15. And, in that regard, extrinsic evidence is admissible, even where the parole
evidence rule applies, as long as the evidence offers a reasonable interpretation of the
written contract. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging
Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-45 (Cal. 1968).
16. The most renown textualist on the bench today is certainly Justice Antonin
Scalia. His classic statement of textualism can be found in his 1977 work. See SCALIA,
supra note 9; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 119 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 621 (1990); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863
(1930).
17. A prominent jurist who advocates that theory is Justice John Paul Stevens.
His whimsical statement of the case for intentionalism is introduced in the following:
The Duke of Gloucester, later King Richard the Third, begins his opening
soliloquy with the famous line: "Now is the winter of our discontent." The
listener, who at first assumes that the word "now" refers to an unhappy winter, soon learns that war-tom England has been "[m]ade glorious by this son
of York." It is now summer not winter and "[g]rim-visag'd War hath
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and have imposed a kind of analytical order on the rules by assigning
them to theoretical categories. But it is unclear how one theory, as
opposed to another, actually does a better job of divining the intent of
the legislature (in the case of textualism) or that of the parties to a
contract (in the case of intentionalism). Theoretical categories simply
do not resolve the legitimacy problem. 18 The same can be said for

attempts to categorize the rules by their purposes or characteristics.

9

smooth'd his wrinkled" forehead. Words-even a simple word like "now"may have a meaning that is not immediately apparent.
John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1373, 1373 (1992) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF RICHARD THE THIRD act 1, sc. 1, line 1 (G. Blakemore Evans ed., 1974) (emphasis added));
see also Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence:
The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998); Martin H.
Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:
Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803
(1994). A related theory has been dubbed "purposivism"; it looks to an assumed
purpose of the statute. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
18. Some jurists and scholars dodge the legitimacy bullet by positing more pragmatic solutions. Adrian Vermeule points out the costly and ultimately futile search
for the "right" interpretive rule should be abandoned in favor of picking a rule consistently: "It is more important that judges select one answer and apply it consistently
over time than that they select the right answer. If the default rules [both statutory
and contract interpretive canons are commonly referred to as "default" rules] are
fixed, Congress [or, one assumes, the parties to a contract] can, over time, incorporate
the content of the background rules into its [their] anticipations of judicial behavior."
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 140 (2000). Another
pragmatic choice (with significant normative overtones) has been suggested by Judge
Posner who has argued that interpretation should be resolved in favor of the rule that
yields the preferred best result in light of its effects in the future. Richard A. Posner,
PragmaticAdjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL
THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998); see also infra notes
46-53, 61-66 and accompanying text.
19. Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett divide the canons into three categories: "textual" (the application of the rule is within the text, for example: the specific controls
the general); "substantive" (a presumption "of so long continuance . .. so universal
and so reasonable in itself, as that the presumption is violent that the parties contracted with reference to it, and made it a part of their agreement." Walls v. Bailey,
49 N.Y. 464, 472-73 (1872)); and "reference" or canons which look to other sources
("extrinsic aids") for interpretive assistance, for example: legislative history (statutes)
or past performance, prior dealing or usages of the trade (contracts). WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE

818 (3d ed. 2001) (cited in Adam W. Kiracofe, The
Codified Canons of Statutory Construction: A Response and Proposal to Nicholas
Rosekranz's Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,84 B.U. L. REV. 571, 574 n.15
(2004)). On the other hand, Stephen Ross has assigned the canons to one of only two
categories: "descriptive" or "normative." Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone,
Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You? 45 VAND. L. REV.
561, 563 (1992). Beginning with Llewellyn's declaration that a statute "'must be read
in the light of some assumed purpose' if it is to make any sense," id. at 578, Professor
Ross explains that Llewellyn's catalog of canons "are principles that involve predictions as to what the legislature must have meant, or probably meant, by employing
particular statutory language." Id. at 563. Professor Ross identifies normative canons
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
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So Llewellyn's thesis remains unassailable: the rules of interpreta-

tion are tools of argument in a particular case rather than formulas for
determining legal results-and the validity of Llewellyn's insight simply underscores the inherent indeterminacy of the interpretive project.

III.

FACTORS THAT RAISE ISSUES OF ILLEGITIMACY
IN INTERPRETATION

The indeterminacy problem has always been with us; it is endemic
to the interpretive project. However, in today's climate it seems to be
especially troubling, presenting what may become a real challenge to
the presumption of legitimacy in judicial interpretation. In the current
era, indeterminacy has been exacerbated or, at the very least, it has
been made more evident by three principal factors: (1) jurisprudential
scholarship, (2) judicial activism by, especially, the U.S. Supreme
Court and (3) the obvious diversity of viewpoint that characterizes the
legal culture in which judicial decisions are rendered both domestically and transnationally.
A.

Jurisprudenceand the Problem of Legitimacy

With regard to jurisprudence, the first factor that seems to magnify
the indeterminacy problem is the substantial body of scholarship,
which has contributed significantly to our understanding of how legal
rules operate by revealing the illusory nature of law's essentialist
claims." In diverse and interesting ways, this scholarship has deepas "principles, created in the federal system exclusively by judges, that do not purport
to describe accurately what Congress actually intended or what the words of a statute
mean, but rather direct courts to construe any ambiguity in a particular way in order
to further some policy objective." Id. And he cites Judge Wald's example of a presumptive construction to avoid interference with states' rights in the absence of a
clear congressional intent to interfere. Id.; see also infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
20. See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J.
1515 (1991) (explaining how "critical legal studies" has been assimilated in legal studies albeit in a diluted form). I refer here generally to the leftist ("critical legal") theorists who in the 1970s and 1980s challenged formalism and its belief in objectivity
under the mantra of "law is politics." See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); J.M. Balkin, Taking Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin

and the CLS Critique, 55 UMKC L. REV. 392 (1987); Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); John Henry Schlegel, Notes
Toward an Intimate, Opinionated,and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1984); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62
TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984). In developing its distinctive viewpoint the Crits crossed
disciplinary boundaries and drew insights and methods from literary, hermeneutical,
structural, psychological, and social theory both in the Anglo tradition and from the
Continent. Their view was especially informed by the postmodernist sensibility in
philosophy generally of which, I would argue, the Crits project is a part. The
postmodernist turn pervades discourse in virtually every discipline and imposes a hue
of skepticism wherever its discerning eye alights. For a broad survey of postmodernism, see THE ANTI-AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON POSTMODERN CULTURE (Hal Foster ed.,
1983).
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ened our awareness and given us new clarity of vision by convincingly
demonstrating law's contingent meanings. 21 This skepticism has become so pervasive that it has metamorphosed from a radical outlier
position to a widely-accepted, not to say commonplace, body of assumptions about the law within established academic thought.2 2 In

recent decades, as its initial iconoclastic status has given way to an
established theoretical position, the success of this skeptical turn of

mind has left in its wake the demise of Cartesian certainties. This loss,
or at least erosion, of an essentialist foundation has had a destabilizing
effect on law's legitimizing function. If all legal rules, like all other

human constructs, are relatively indeterminate and contingent (as the
skeptics insist), where in this shifting terrain of uncertainty
can law
23
stake a convincing claim to the terra firma of legitimacy?
In fulfilling its legitimizing function, law has traditionally relied

upon some sort of essentialist basis. It has appealed to something
outside of itself that legitimizes it and by which (or through which) it
claims authority to legitimize its separate performances or applica-

tions. But these skeptical insights challenge the very notion of an objective fundamental essence or authority upon which the idea of
legitimacy has traditionally rested. So the skeptical turn in jurisprudence generally compounds the indeterminacy problem in contract
and statute interpretation, specifically.
B.

JudicialActivism and the Problem of Legitimacy

Another factor that exacerbates the problem of indeterminacy in
legal interpretation is the perception that the U.S. Supreme Court appears to be increasingly result-oriented in its decision making: first
reaching a result that comports with its own policy preferences and
then working backwards to construct a rationale to support that re21. For purposes of this investigation into statutory and contract interpretation,
see, for example, Peter C. Schanck, UnderstandingPostmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505 (1992); Jay M. Feinman,
CriticalApproaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829 (1982). Two examples of
interdisciplinary scholarship that creatively highlight the indeterminacy of legal rules
are Steven Winter's path-breaking work on law and cognitive theory, STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001), and Jack Balkin and
Sanford Levinson's enlightening construct of law as a performance art, as well as their
investigation of canons, LEGAL CANONS (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000).
22. Even naturalists now define philosophical questions to include empirical facts
or evidence about knowledge and how the mind works. See, e.g., ALVIN I. GOLDMAN,
KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD (1999).
23. In light of postmodern skepticism, even an enlightened, neo-pragmatic, and
largely, postmodernist approach to statutory interpretation has run afoul of a
postmodernist critique when it attempts to employ postmodernism as a basis for statutory interpretation. See Schanck, supra note 21, at 2569-70 (arguing that Eskridge
and Frickey's attempt to justify their largely pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation relies on a "pragmatic epistemology" which renders it inconsistent with
postmodern theory.). In other words, postmodernism cannot serve as the foundation
for a new theory of statutory interpretation. See id. at 2589.
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sult-an approach that may appear somehow "unprincipled." This
perception has recently generated a whole spate of articles seeking
to
24
come to terms with the quandary of activist decisionmaking.
It is now, perhaps, the consensus view that the Rehnquist Court is
an activist Court and that its activism is associated with the positions it
began to take a number of years ago with regard to Federalism and
other headline-grabbing constitutional issues. 25 Less well-known and
less publicly controversial is that some of its decisions have been resting, not on constitutional authority, but on the canons of interpretation 26 (both statutory and contract interpretation), 27 and it is those
decisions that are most germane to my thesis today because they
demonstrate how result-oriented activism might undermine the perceived legitimacy of judicial decisions. We know that rules of interpretation form an ostensibly restraintist and narrow basis for judicial
decision making and one that appears to be singularly deferential to
the drafting parties (or to the legislature, in the case of statutory interpretation). What happens when it becomes increasingly evident that
these restraintist rules are being used to achieve activist ends? Do the
judicial opinions seem less principled as a consequence of the apparent activism? Do their outcomes seem less legitimate? And if so, can
the taint of these decisions affect our perception of the legitimacy of
other judicial decisions or the interpretive function of the courts
generally?
24. See, e.g., Herman Schwartz, INTRODUCTION TO THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (Herman, Schwartz ed., 2002); William P. Marshall,
Conservatives and the Seven Sins of JudicialActivism, 73 U. COLO. REV. 1217 (2002).
25. See generally Barbara K. Bucholtz, Gestalt Flips by an Acrobatic Supreme
Court and the Business-related Cases on Its 2000-2001 Docket, 37 TULSA L. REV. 305
(2001).
26. See generally Barbara K. Bucholtz, Employment Rights and Wrongs: ADA Issues in the 2001-2003 Supreme Court Term, 38 TULSA L. REV. 363 (2002).
27. For example, in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002), the Court
was required to construe both the nature, and legal effect, of the contractual arrangement between the employer and its employees with regard to seniority issues and to
determine how to interpret the ADA's mandate of a "reasonable accommodation"
for a "qualified" individual. Id. at 393-97 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A),
12111(8), (9)(B) (1994)). At issue was a nonbinding seniority system which the employer reserved the right to modify at will. Id. at 394. Barnett was refused a job
transfer because of a job-related injury but the employer argued that the seniority
system precluded the transfer and that Barnett's request was unreasonable. Id. at
395-97. A majority of the Court agreed, stating that accommodation is not reasonable if it imposes an "undue hardship" on an employer by requiring it to contravene a
nondiscriminatory seniority system. Id. In dissent, Justice Souter pointed out that the
majority's interpretations of the contract and of the statute were flawed: the nonbinding seniority system would probably not be considered a contractual arrangement in
state court and the legislative history of the provision at issue expressly provided that
seniority systems were only one factor to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of an accommodation. Id. at 421-23 (Souter, J., dissenting). For a more complete discussion of US. Airways and the interpretive conventions used in the case, see
Bucholtz, supra note 26, at 374-77.
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In posing these questions, I rely on three assumptions. First, it is
commonly understood that a certain amount of "legislating from the
bench" is endemic to judicial decisionmaking. The act of interpretation and application ineluctably creates new law: at the very least it
must be said that by deciding what the law requires in a particular
case, a judicial decision forecloses all other possibilities of what it
might have required. If a city ordinance banning vehicles from city
parks is interpreted by a court to exclude only 4-wheeled motorized
vehicles, then henceforth "vehicles" for purposes of the ordinance
cannot mean any other kind of vehicles. Thus, all judicial decisions
are, to that extent, activist. But judicial activism can, of course, mean
much more. Here I use the term to describe decisions which overturn,
either directly (explicitly) or indirectly (by interpretive devices that
significantly undermine existing law), legislative enactments and judicial precedents.
Second, I do not argue that judicial activism is necessarily reprehensible. On the contrary, there may be very good reasons for invalidating statutes and overturning precedents. By the same token, activism
in other contexts might be considered unjustified. How we might distinguish legitimate from illegitimate activism will be considered in
Parts III and IV of this article. Here, I simply demonstrate how activism in the current Court masks itself in the cloak of techniques we
typically associate with judicial restraint: the rules of statutory
construction.
Third, I assume that when most decisions in an area of law are ostensibly reached by technical application of facially neutral interpretive rules, such that the rules selected consistently work to the
disadvantage of a particular group or class, while selection of equally
applicable interpretive rules would consistently work to the advantage
of that group, then the activism appears to be result-oriented: working
from a desired policy preference backwards to an interpretive rationale. This is particularly so when the selected rules interpret statutory
law in ways that disadvantage the group the law was designed to protect. Recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)28 illustrate this dynamic and show that
the ADA has become fertile ground for the majority's activism. 29 As
28. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
29. Recent cases construing the ADA in the Rehnquist era include: Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002);
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). For a more detailed discussion of these cases see Bucholtz, supra note 26.
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a typical example, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.3 0 is a tour de force
of statutory interpretation and an elaborate example of Llewellyn's
point that for every valid and relevant rule of statutory construction
there is an opposite and (usually) equally valid and (arguably) relevant rule.
In Sutton, opposing rules focused on the issues of: (1) requisite deference to agency interpretation (2) the ubiquitous plain meaning rule
(3) the deference which should be accorded to congressional findings
(4) when legislature history is an appropriate interpretive tool, and (5)
what it means to read a statute as a consistent whole to avoid eviscerating any part of it. When one reads through these recent ADA opinions, including Sutton, what first strikes you is the obvious lack of
interpretive coherence in the reasoning of the Justices. In what appears to be a virtual melee of rule-hurling, Justices occasionally even
contradict themselves in their selection of rules. For instance, in Sutton the majority narrowed the application of the ADA by interpreting
its language (that the ADA affords protection only where a "physical
or mental impairment" or disability "substantially limits" one or more
of the major life activities of an individual)3 1 to exclude correctable
disabilities like myopia.3 2 Writing for the 5-4 majority in Sutton, Justice O'Connor declined to defer to the regulations promulgated by the
three implementing agencies of the ADA (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Justice Department, and Department
of Transportation), which had uniformly interpreted the ADA language to consider covered disabilities without regard for the availability of "mitigating measures." She reasoned that, "no agency has been
delegated authority to interpret the term 'disability"' 3 3 and, in any
case, she added, the meanings of the term "disability" and of "substantially limits" are plain under the ADA.34 But in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing,Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,3 5 where the Court held that
the employer was not obligated by the ADA to accommodate the employee's carpal tunnel syndrome and related afflictions she had developed on the job site because these maladies did not "substantially
limit" her "major life activities," Justice O'Connor actually relied on
the EEOC regulations defining "substantially limit" to reach her conclusion on behalf of the majority.3 6
The ADA decisions, reached by the Court over a period of three
recent terms, are textbook examples of Llewellyn's "thrust" and
"parry" analysis of the interpretive rules. They also show how policy
30. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471.
31. Id. at 482.
32. Id. at 494.
33. Id. at 479.
34. Id. at 481-82.
35. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
36. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 194, 195-96 (2002) (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2001)).

THE INTERPRETIVE PROJECT

2005]

preferences by an activist majority can be realized through selective
rule application. Almost without exception3 7 all of the ADA decisions
during this period reached results that narrowed either the scope of
the statutes or the employee rights they were designed to protect.
And it is especially important to notice that the ADA is a remedial or
prophylactic statute usually considered to be entitled to broad or liberal interpretation, if the legislative intent is to be observed.3 8 In the
ADA decisions, it is hard to resist the conclusion that facially deferential rules of statutory construction had, in fact, been selected and
deployed to achieve a certain result which was in conflict with the
prophylactic intent of the legislation at issue.
Common law rules of interpretation simply do not tell us how to
locate legitimate judicial interpretations and to distinguish them from
illegitimate ones. Activist judicial interpretations bring that problem
to our attention.3 9
C.

Pluralism and the Problem of Legitimacy

A final factor that exacerbates the apparent indeterminacy of interpretation and the incipient problem of illegitimacy is our relatively
recent awareness that different socio-cultural perspectives can render
very different but arguably valid narratives about a particular legal
issue. That is to say, a third reason why the normative value of canon
selection might seem more problematic today is that both domestically and globally we are much more cognizant of the putative validity
of diverse viewpoints than we were in previous eras. A polity characterized by an apparent homogeneity creates a sense that dominant
viewpoints (including interpretive viewpoints) are objectively normative. That might describe American society in earlier decades. But in
today's pluralistic polity, where diverse voices are acknowledged both
domestically and globally, that apparent consensus may break down.
In previous decades what appeared to be quite plain and unambiguous now reveals itself to be fraught with multiple meanings and
possibilities.
37. In Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S 624, 655 (1998), the Court ruled that the ADA
protects individuals who have tested positive for HIV.
38. The express purpose of the ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
39. There is at least some evidence that the majority's activism did not "get it
right" in interpreting other remedial employment legislation. The Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil Rights Act of 2004, H.R.
3809, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004); Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure
a Stronger Society: Civil Rights Act of 2004, S. 2088, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004),
would reverse some of the activist judicial decisions that narrowed the remedies available under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act, and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act. Wide Ranging Rights Bill Would Expand Title VII, Equal Pay
Act, Remove Damage Cap, 72 U.S. L. WK. 2477 (Feb. 17, 2004).
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So, these are three factors-jurisprudence, judicial activism, and social pluralism-that have increased our awareness that the common
law, with its capacity to endure in periods of societal change and to
maintain societal stability in spite of that change, also runs the risk of
delegitimizing the judicial functions of interpretation because its very
strength-flexibility-is also its most menacing weakness. What then
can be done about it? How do we rescue the interpretive method of
common law rules from this precipice of illegitimacy?
IV.

A.

PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING THE INDETERMINACY PROBLEM
IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Proposalsfor the Replacement of Common Law Interpretive
Rules With Statutory Interpretive Rules

With regard to the indeterminacy problem arising from statutory
interpretation in federal courts, competing approaches have emerged
in recent scholarship. Some scholars advocate the abandonment, or at
least a drastic restriction of the common law interpretive regime, itself, by congressional enactment of interpretive rules.4' Critics point
out, however, that among other problems with this proposal is its vulnerability to a constitutional challenge: under separation of powers
doctrine, can Congress impose an interpretive method on the judiciary?4 ' Another approach is advocated by Professor Ross. He takes
what contracts professors typically call an "information-forcing" approach to the indeterminacy problem of statutory interpretation. In
sum, he argues that if Congress is displeased with the way the courts
have used the canons to interpret its legislation, then Congress can
trump the courts' interpretations by drafting statutes with the canons,
and their uses, in mind. That means, inter alia, that the statutes, themselves, should expressly indicate how the courts should construe any
statutory language they contain that is likely to be subject to the vagaries of canonical selection.4 2
40. See Rosenkranz, supra note 8 (Rosenkranz invokes the federal rulemaking authority as a curative for the indeterminacy problem.). For other scholarship advocating some form of legislative response to the indeterminacy problem of the common
law interpretive rules see Gary E. O'Connor, Restatement (First)of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 333, 345 n.59 (2004).
41. For a compilation of scholarship making that argument see O'Connor, supra
note 40, at 348 n.78.
42. With regard to what Professor Ross has called "normative" canons (canons or
"presumptions" reflecting judicial policy, generally, rather than legislative intent, specifically), see Ross, supra note 19, at 563, he advocates that legislators be made aware
of how courts are using these presumptions:
One workable approach would be for the Congressional Research Service's
American Law Division to compile and publish periodically a list of normative canons being employed by the courts. This "checklist" could then be
used by attorneys on the staff of the House and Senate Legislative Counsels.
For example, when draft legislation appears to impose duties on state governments, these attorneys could notify the author of the bill that express
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Proposalsfor Assigning HierarchicalWeights to Various
Common Law Interpretive Rules

Other scholars counsel that the courts should cultivate their own
garden by emphasizing certain policy-driven canons (what Stephen

Ross has called "normative" canons) 4 3 over an array of available alternatives. Professor Eskridge, for example, in several articles has ad-

vocated a canon selection that favors a contemporary gloss on
statutory texts: reading statutes to give effect to contemporary values

and goals. 44 Other scholars have weighed in on both sides of the via-

bility of legislative history as an interpretive tool.45
On balance, common law based corrective measures for addressing

the unacceptable levels of indeterminacy which currently plague statu-

tory interpretation appear more likely to succeed than do proposals
for a statutory preemption of the interpretive rules. Not only is a legislated regime of statutory interpretation likely to face a successful

constitutional challenge but there is also a certain futility in attempting to close statutory gaps and resolve statutory ambiguities with statutory rules.46 Moreover, in attempting to substitute a legislative
regime for interpretation of legislation, Congress might well find itself
abrogation of state sovereign immunity will be necessary to secure judicial
enforcement of these duties, and the legislator then would be able to make a
judgment about the political viability of such an express provision.
Id. at 571-72 (citation omitted). With regard to what Professor Ross has called "descriptive" canons ("principles that involve predictions as to what the legislature must
have meant, or probably meant"), see id. at 563, he advocates clarity of drafting,
"[T]he key strategy for Congress in ensuring that its policy preferences are not frustrated by judicial abuse of descriptive canons is to manifest unequivocally its purpose." Id. at 573-74. And to the extent that legislative history reveals that purpose,
Ross lays out a series of Congressional maneuvers that could deflect judicial skepticism about the infirmity of legislative history as an interpretive resource. Id. at
574-78.
43. Id. at 563-64.
44. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
14-25 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137
U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989).
45. For an overview of that debate, see Solan, supra note 9. Professor Solan calls
the debate, "Perhaps the greatest controversy over statutory interpretation during the
past two decades." Id. And after summarizing the case against the use of legislative
history as an interpretive tool (it has been called variously "undemocratic," "unreliable," "incoherent," and "unresponsive to changes in the interpretive environment
over time."), Solan develops an argument in favor of using legislative history in statutory construction, proposing that it is both inescapable and reasonable. Id.
46. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 407, 504 (1989) (arguing that interpretation inevitably requires reliance on
underlying principles); see also THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS, supra note 2, at
292 (pointing out the impossibility of a comprehensive preemption of customary law
by code law); FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 121 (1839)
("Construction is unavoidable. Men who use words, even with the best intent and
great care as well as skill, cannot foresee all possible complex cases . . ").
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"dancing the quadrille. '4 7 Thus, as between the proposals that advocate a statutory approach to the indeterminacy problem and the common law proposals identified above, the common law approach would
appear to have a better chance of success.
However, the common law proposals discussed in this section may
face an insurmountable problem of demonstrating in some conclusive
way that a particular hierarchical weighting of the rules is superior to
all other alternatives. While each of the proposed hierarchical systems has merit, it is not clear that any one of them should be decisive
in all cases. There seems to be no essentialist basis for establishing, ex
ante, a hierarchical valuation for different kinds of interpretive rules.
It is, perhaps, for that reason that some scholars take a pragmatic
approach.48
Some of the recent scholarship on statutory interpretation faults the
judicial practice of invoking interpretive rules as if the rules themselves had talismanic powers. 49 These scholars expressly reject the approach taken by those who would rank the various interpretive rules
according to an ex ante value system. According to this critique, the
only viable solution is a pragmatic one-judicial persuasion. Judges
must persuade us of the legitimacy of their decisions by elaborating
their reasoning. They must explain why, given the facts of a particular
case, the text before it, and the availability of several opposing but
also applicable rules, one rule is to be preferred over any of the alternatives. In other words, we should postulate that legitimacy resides in
the persuasiveness of the reason for choosing a particular interpretive
rule in a particular case, rather than deceive ourselves that it is the
rule itself or rule theory from which it derives that imparts authority.
Consonant with that approach is Gary O'Connor's recent article in
which he proposes that the American Law Institute (ALI) promulgate
a "Restatement of Statutory Interpretation." His path-breaking proposal uses the Restatements of Contracts as inspiration and model for
the project.5" Noting the obvious overlap between contract and statutory interpretation, O'Connor argues that it is a closer fit than the
"evidence rules/interpretive rules" analogy upon which the Rosenkanz proposal for a legislated regime of interpretive rules is pre47. See Justice Rehnquist's opinion stating: "'in this Court the parties [or, for purposes of this Article, read "Justices"] changed positions as nimbly as if dancing a
quadrille."' Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 539-40 (1978) (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 87 (1953)). Professor Eskridge has said, "Statutory interpretation is the Cinderella of legal scholarship. Once scorned and neglected ...it now dances in the ballroom." ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 44, at 1. Cinderella dances the
quadrille.
48. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
49. For an excellent discussion of this approach see Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada,at http://aixl.uottawa.ca/-resulliv/legdr/siinscc.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
50. O'Connor, supra note 40.
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mised. 51 His proposal is simply that the ALI should initiate a Restatement project for statutory interpretation.5 2 He suggests that resources
for compiling a list of the extant rules of statutory interpretation might
include: Sutherland's treatise; the lists of canons identified by Professor Eskridge and by Professor Llewellyn; state legislation covering
statutory interpretation; West's Topical Index on Statutes; rules of
statutory interpretation employed in other common law countries; the
Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act of 1993, and appellate
court (both state and federal) decisions.5 3 He also suggests how the
Restatement might be organized, 54 and he discusses, without resolving, the divisive issue of how to regard legislative history.
O'Connor makes a persuasive case for handling the troubling issue
of indeterminacy in statute construction by delineating consensus
views of judge-made (and, in some cases, legislatively crafted) rules
using the common law method of Restatements-the time-honored
method by which the common law has kept rule proliferation within
some kind of manageable scale and measurement. Indeed,
O'Connor's proposal has great promise: it maintains the flexibility of
the common law approach to statutory interpretation without permitting that approach to get unduly "messy '56 or to reach a level of indeterminacy that threatens to delegitimize the interpretive project.5 7
V.

IMPLEMENTING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO
THE INDETERMINACY

PROBLEM IN

CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

When we turn to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement), the model upon which the O'Connor proposal is expressly
51. Id. at 349-50. O'Connor also cites a number of articles that view statutory and
contract interpretive rules as analogous. Id. at 350 n.92.
52. See id. at 351-52 (for a description of the American Law Institute and its
procedures).
53. Id. at 352-53.
54. What follows is the proposed organizational structure:
Chapter I: Intrinsic or Grammatical Aids to Interpretation
Chapter II: Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation
Chapter III: Interpretive Presumptions-General
Chapter IV: Interpretation of Repealing Acts, Amending Acts, and Acts Incorporating Other Statutes
Chapter V: Interpretation of Consolidating and Codifying Acts
Chapter VI: Interpretation of Particular Kinds of Statutes
§ 601 Appeals, Statutes Authorizing ....
§ 602 Deportation, Statutes Authorizing ....
§ 603 Penal Statutes ....

§ 604 Tax Statutes ....
Chapter VII: Retroactivity.
Id. at 354.
55. Id. at 355.
56. Id. at 335.
57. See supra Part II, notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
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based, we see that the model, itself, may require ALI attention if the
pragmatic approach to common law rule selection is to succeed.
While the O'Connor proposal clearly maps the interpretive rules, the
Restatement seems to exhibit a "messiness" in that regard: a failure
expressly to illuminate the interpretive process. And it is to that
"messiness" that we should next turn. The overarching organizational
scheme of the Restatement is logical: following, as it does, (after a
section on the meaning of terms) the sequential issues about contracts
in the order by which the court must address them: formation, enforceability, nonperformance, third party interests, and remedies.58
This ordering of the issues makes abundant sense because a court
would typically not address, for example, a remedies issue unless it
first found that a valid, enforceable contract had been formed and
subsequently breached. The organizational structure is sound, to that
extent. But then, a certain "messiness" insinuates itself into the Restatement, and into our way of understanding its rules, and how the
interpretive process works within each of these sequential issues.
We have come to view the Restatement as a system of "default
rules." The "default rule paradigm," 59 described in the scholarship of
Charles Goetz and Robert E. Scott, views contract law as filling gaps
in incomplete contracts such that the probable intent of the parties is
realized and uncertain judicial outcomes as well as transaction costs
are reduced. To the extent that parties understand which of the rules
the court will supply in contracts where there is a gap or missing term
and to the extent that parties reject these default rules, they will supply their preferred terms expressly. That is, Restatement rules fill
gaps in contracts where the parties fail to supply express terms and
these default gap-fillers are considered to be terms most parties in
similar contractual arrangements would include. Default rules, then,
are "majoritarian." Furthermore, the default rules may also be "information forcing." That is, a party's awareness of a default rule may
cause that party to disclose information to the other party so as to
avoid imposition of the default rule whenever it would create an unfavorable result.6 °
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CorRACSrS ch. 2-16 (1981). Broken down
by chapter, the issues can be found as follows:
Formation issues: Chapters 2-4
Enforceability issues: Chapters 5-9
Nonperformance issues: Chapters 10-12
Third party issues: Chapters 13-15
Remedies issues: Chapter 16.
Id.
59. Charles Goetz and Robert E. Scott are usually credited with conceptualizing
the law of contract as a set of default rules which come into play to fill gaps in incomplete contracts. For a reassessment of the twenty-five year old paradigm, see Robert
E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84 (2003).

60. Id. at 85.
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Indeed, the Hadley case we celebrate at this conference is an example of how default rules can be information forcing.6 1 Hadley is, famously, a case about remedies. It limits the damages recoverable by
the non-breaching party. It states the rule that damages incurred by
the non-breaching party as a consequence of a breach must be foreseeable to be recoverable.6 2
To summarize the familiar story, the only crank shaft at plaintiffs'
grist mill broke, causing the mill to shutdown. Plaintiffs sent the shaft
to defendants for delivery to a company engaged to make a new one.
But defendants delayed in delivering the shaft; the delay amounted to
a breach, and as a consequence of the breach, plaintiffs lost several
additional days worth of operating profits.6 3
The court decided that, lacking knowledge that the broken shaft
was plaintiffs' only shaft, the defendants could not have foreseen and,
therefore, should not be liable for plaintiffs' damages caused by the
negligent delay. 64 Hadley is, perhaps, our most famous illustration of
how the default rule paradigm works.
At the same time, it also demonstrates the overarching role of interpretation in contract law: before the court can invoke and apply a default rule, it must first interpret the contract. Hadley is an example of
that dynamic, as well. In Hadley, the court said:
Here it is true that the shaft was actually sent back to serve as a
model for a new one, and that the want of a new one was the only
cause of the stoppage of the mill, and that the loss of profits really
arose from not sending down the new shaft in proper time, and that
this arose from the delay in delivering the broken one to serve as a
model. But it is obvious that, in the great multitude of cases of millers sending off broken shafts to third persons by a carrier under
ordinary circumstances, such consequences would not, in all
probability, have occurred .... 65
In Hadley, as a preliminary matter the court interpreted the contract in light of its terms and surrounding circumstances. The court
61. Id.

62. For an overview of the case see JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO
ON CONTRACTS § 14.5 (5th ed. 2003). Perillo notes that the two rules stated in Hadley
are that: damages from breach are limited 1) to those "'fairly and reasonably be considered ... arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such
breach of contract. . ."' and 2) and to those "'such as may reasonably be supposed to

have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as
the probable result of the breach of it."' Id. at 569 (quoting Hadley v. Baxendale, 156
Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1854)). These two rules were landmark because, prior to the
case, damage awards were "left to the unfettered discretion of the jury." Id. at 568.

63. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 146 (Ex. 1854).
64. Id. at 151. "[W]e find that the only circumstances here communicated by the
plaintiffs to the defendants at the time the contract was made, were, that the article to
be carried was the broken shaft of a mill, and that the plaintiffs were the millers of
that mill." Id.
65. Id.
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had to find that the breaching party could not reasonably foresee the
consequential damages suffered by the mill owners before it found
that the default rule applied. Neither the contract terms nor the context in which they were conceived made defendants aware of the potential for damages caused by an unwarranted delivery delay. As a
subsequent British case put it, "The first question [in Hadley situations] is, what did the parties forecast as the probable course of events
in relation to the contract when it was made?"6 6 And that, of course, is
an interpretive exercise.
Interpretation is endemic to the judge's job in a contracts case. Default rules may be paradigmatic, but, as a preliminary and penultimate
matter, contract law is a regime of interpretive rules. Therefore the
Restatement itself may need re-viewing and re-iteration. Returning
to the organizational structure of the Restatement, we see that nothing in its organizational structure indicates the pre-eminence of the
interpretive project in contract law. Indeed, when Gary O'Connor
looks to the Restatement as a model for interpretive rules, he locates
them, as other scholars have, in various and sundry places but certainly not as a part of each sequential question and certainly not in
any predictable order.6 7 O'Connor specifically identifies the following
sections of the Second Restatement as the interpretive sections: § 21
(Intention to be Legally Bound); § 200 (Interpretation of Promise or
Agreement); § 201 (Whose Meaning Prevails); § 202 (Rules in Aid of
Interpretation); § 203 (Standards of Preference in Interpretation);
§ 204 (Supplying an Omitted Essential Term); § 206 (Interpretation
Against the Draftsman); § 213 (Parol Evidence Rule); § 214 (Evidence of Prior Contemporaneous Agreements or Negotiations); § 216
(Consistent Additional Terms); §§ 219-223 (Scope as Affected by Usage). 68 And it is not surprising that he does so because that is the way
the organizational structure of the current Restatement presents the
interpretive project in contract law. In fact, that structure is misleading because it fails to reveal the pervasive and systematic nature of
interpretation.
A recapitulation of the Restatement to show how, as to each sequential question (formation, enforceability, nonperformance, third
parties interests, and remedies), interpretation plays a preliminary and
overarching role should be considered by the ALI. This kind of recapitulation would buttress the credibility of judicial decision-making by
making the interpretive project in contract law more coherent and by
making the interpretive choices available to the judges more transparent. In an era where the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking is being
66. Patrick & Co., Ltd. v. Russo-British Grain Exp. Co., (1927) 28 Lloyd's List L.
Rep. 358, 360 (K.B.).
67. O'Connor, supra note 50, at nn.86-91 and accompanying text.
68. Id.
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called into question, this kind of recapitulation might have special
merit.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Common law rules remain the preferred regime for interpreting
contracts and statutes because of their Janus-like flexibility. But flexibility carries with it the problem of indeterminacy which can undermine perceptions about the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking.
Indeterminacy can be constrained by holding judges responsible for
persuading us that one interpretive rule, in a particular case, is a better choice than any of its available competitors. With regard to contract interpretation, the Restatement should be recapitulated to
illuminate the interpretive process in rule selection. That illumination, in turn, should facilitate our ability to evaluate a court's rule selection and its attempts to persuade us of its validity. All of which are,
I argue, crucial to facilitate the selection and reasoning process of the
interpretive project which is crucial to perceptions of legitimacy in judicial decisionmaking.

